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Autobots, Decepticons, and Panopticons:
The Transformative Nature of GPS Technology
and the Fourth Amendment
BY: VIVEK KOTHARI
I. INTRODUCTION

A

getaway car squeals around a street corner on three
wheels, followed closely by at least two police
cruisers. Instead of giving hot pursuit, the police
slow down slightly and shoot a dart from the radiator of their cruiser that embeds itself into the getaway car.
The police then retreat. Unbeknownst to the alleged criminals,
their car has been transformed into a homing device, allowing
law enforcement to track their movements remotely and without the fuss of a high profile, potentially
dangerous high-speed car chase. Law
enforcement can simply arrive at the
vehicle’s destination and apprehend any
complicit individuals.
One would only be half wrong to
assume that this sequence of events is
the product of Tinseltown. The Los Angeles Police Department recently outfitted some of their cruisers with Global
Positioning System (“GPS”) darts in
order to eliminate high-speed chases
and the casualties and property damage they entail.1 The echoes of George
Orwell’s Big Brother are unmistakable.
This is the most creative and experimental, application of a GPS device in law
enforcement.2
In a more common application of
GPS technology, law enforcement attaches a GPS device to a vehicle when it is parked in a public
space.3 Officers do so without the owner’s knowledge and, more
importantly, without a warrant from a “neutral and detached
magistrate.”4 These devices enable perfect tracking twenty-four
hours a day, for weeks, months, or years at a time at only a
nominal cost. Surreptitiously, your participation in a political
rally is noted; your trip to the abortion clinic, recorded; your
weekly visits to the psychiatrist, revealed.
Indeed, by using multiple devices against one target, the
police can easily compile a comprehensive dossier regarding
one’s individual choices.5 Consequently, they can learn not only
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where you are and where you will be, but also what you have
taken with you. The devices cost very little both to purchase and
to monitor, enabling law enforcement to track the movements
of large groups of people. Law enforcement can then mine that
data to create a vivid, detailed digest of your life and record of
acquaintances. Currently, only a lack of imagination restrains
law enforcement’s application of this technology. As presently
interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Constitution does not
limit the Government’s ability to place a GPS device on your
person, vehicle, running shoes, backpack, or purse.
The Fourth Amendment provides
the most direct constitutional protection for individual privacy in the face
of unprecedented government intrusion
into previously personal and sacrosanct
zones.6 The Fourth Amendment protects privacy, property, and liberty by
prohibiting “unreasonable searches and
seizures” of “persons, houses, papers,
and effects,”7 but federal courts have
been reluctant to extend its protections
to prohibit the use of GPS devices. It
is no surprise then that the protections
afforded by the Fourth Amendment lag
behind advancements in technology.
The Fourth Amendment has always played the proverbial tortoise to
technology’s hare. Both began at the
starting line as “bricks and mortar”
concepts, grounded in the real world.
Technology quickly bounded ahead to an early lead, first with
the invention of the telegraph and telephone and then with internet and satellite technology, creating not only virtual worlds,
but also permitting virtual access to the real world. Meanwhile,
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
plods along, slowly assessing the changes that are wrought by
technology and, just as surely, creating doctrine to address the
intersection of evolving technology and the law.8
The Fourth Amendment protects privacy, yet its relevance
with respect to emerging technologies is debated, doubted,
and circumscribed. On one hand, some assert that the Fourth
Amendment has lost all relevance in the modern world.9 Conse37

quently, critics argue that only legislative remedies can protect
privacy against increasingly efficient methods of government
surveillance.10 On the other hand, there are those who argue that
the current doctrine takes a simplistic, binary, and ultimately
untenable view of privacy effectively rendering the Fourth
Amendment ineffective as a guarantor of privacy.11 There is
no reason to suggest, however, that the concept of “privacy
is dead,”12 or that technology has somehow rendered Fourth
Amendment privacy protections obsolete.13 New technologies
allow for, but certainly do not require, enhanced and pervasive
government surveillance. Indeed, there are a host of legitimate,
productive, and even frivolous uses of GPS technology.14 Yet
in applying the protections of the Fourth Amendment to cases
of government surveillance, commentators and the Court engage in discussion of only half of the Amendment – the search
prong.15
Ostensibly, the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures equally, but the vast majority of court decisions and scholarly writing concerning the
Fourth Amendment revolves around those issues pertaining to
searches. Because most seizures follow a search, the seizure
prong of the Amendment has received little scholarly or judicial
recognition.16 This is particularly true of the law and scholarship surrounding the Fourth Amendment’s treatment of emerging technologies.17
The use of GPS devices confounds this disparity. Law enforcement is increasingly turning to GPS surveillance as a fundamental part of their investigations, taking advantage of this
technology’s accuracy and minimal cost. Despite its hesitation
to rely on this precedent, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment is robust enough to curtail the use of
GPS devices.
This Article will make two arguments; first, it will demonstrate why search doctrine alone cannot address the issues
raised by the use of GPS devices, and second, it will illustrate
how the seizure prong of the Fourth Amendment requires law
enforcement to obtain a warrant before attaching a GPS device
to a vehicle. It may initially be counterintuitive to classify the
use of GPS devices as a Fourth Amendment seizure. But in a
legal realm where even “a search is not a search,”18 cognitive
dissonance is inevitable.
In advancing the argument above, this Article will take a
significant step towards formulating a conception of the Fourth
Amendment and emerging technologies from a search and a seizure perspective. At the same time, it will extend the analytical
framework of this issue, thereby enabling the Fourth Amendment to remain the ultimate arbiter at the nexus of privacy, security, technology, and government surveillance. After Part II
of the Article outlines a brief history of the Fourth Amendment,
Part III will explore the evolution of both search and seizure
doctrines. This Article will then, in Part IV, examine why, under
38

existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it will be difficult
to categorize the use of GPS devices as a search. In Part V, the
Article will examine GPS technology in light of seizure laws,
concluding that it provides a better response to the applications
of GPS technology than does the search doctrine. Ultimately,
this Article establishes that the Constitution requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant before using GPS technology.

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Like so many of the protections enshrined in the Bill of
Rights, the Fourth Amendment is a product of the excesses of
British hegemony preceding the American Revolution.19 The
paradigmatic case of Wilkes v. Wood20 illustrates how British
authorities regularly ignored their own maxim that “every man’s
house is his castle.”21 John Wilkes was a Member of Parliament
who, in 1763, wrote and published the North Briton Number
45, a pamphlet criticizing one of King George III’s speeches.22
Secretary of State Lord Halifax issued a warrant authorizing
officers to “search for the authors, printers, and publishers of
seditious and treasonable paper.”23 The warrant was general and
specified no names.24 It simply authorized the officers to seize
and detain anyone who they suspected of complicity in the publication of the pamphlet.25 These officers took their mission to
heart, arresting forty-nine people in three days including the
printer, who led them to Wilkes.26 When the officers attempted
to arrest him, however, Wilkes resisted. The officers forcibly
seized him and proceeded to search his house then seizing his
papers and effects.27 After being imprisoned in the Tower of
London, Wilkes won his release on habeas corpus grounds
and successfully sued the Crown for damages.28 The American
colonies celebrated his cause,29 particularly for his opposition
to writs of assistance – general warrants permitting the bearer
to enter any house or other place to search for and seize “‘prohibited and uncustomed’ goods.”30 Wilkes’s case served as the
catalyst for the creation of constitutional protections against
these and other abuses by governmental authorities.31
Fast forward to 1928. At that time, only the physical invasion of a protected space triggered Fourth Amendment protections. That year the Supreme Court considered Olmstead v.
United States,32 which, for the first time, raised the specter of
technology that could be used to conduct surveillance without
breaching physical boundaries. Law enforcement had begun to
use a variety of surveillance technologies to monitor the high
technology of the era – the telephone. In Olmstead, federal
agents used wiretaps to uncover a bootlegging operation spearheaded by Roy Olmstead.33 Olmstead appealed his sentence on
Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds after being tried and convicted of conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act. The
Court ruled that because there “was no entry of the houses of
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offices of the defendants,” the police conducted neither a search
nor a seizure.34
The Court later affirmed this logic in Silverman v. United
States35 and Goldman v. United States.36 Like Olmstead, Goldman did not involve trespass or physical penetration of a space.
Instead federal agents surveilled using a detectaphone, a device
that, when pressed against a wall, allowed the user to overhear the conversation in
the next room.37 Based
heavily on the precedent
of Olmstead, the Court
found no Fourth Amendment violation given the
lack of trespass or physical invasion.38 By contrast, in Silverman the
Court ruled that the use
of a spike mike, which
amplified the conversations of individuals in
an illegal gambling establishment, triggered
Fourth Amendment
concerns.39 The officers
inserted the spike mike
“under a baseboard in a second-floor room of the vacant house
and . . . the spike made contact with a heating duct serving the
house occupied.”40 Thus the officers had tripped the physical
invasion trigger of the Fourth Amendment.
Collectively these cases reveal a Court unwilling to adapt
constitutional protections in the face of evolving and intrusive
technologies. Their decisions steadfastly ignored or overlooked
technical advances in favor of the blind application of legal
principles. While Olmstead ignored the implications of telephonic technology,41 the Silverman Court explicitly ignored
the evidence that advancing technology allowed for enhanced
methods of surveillance, thus making it possible to eavesdrop
on conversations without having to resort to traditional “bricks
and mortar” trespass.42 In the face of prescient dissenting opinions,43 the Court insisted on enforcing an increasingly obsolete
conception of the Fourth Amendment focused exclusively on
physical spaces. This conception threatened to render essential
constitutional protections archaic in a modern and increasingly
virtual world.
The Court would finally concede the impact of emerging technology on the Fourth Amendment paradigm in Katz v.
United States, where they prioritized the privacy interests of
“people, not places.”44 Katz was a gambler and police were
aware of his illicit activities. They knew that he used a particular
telephone in a particular telephone booth to make his wagers.
Armed with this knowledge, they attached an electronic listen-

ing and recording device to the outside of the public telephone
booth from which he had placed his calls. This electronic surveillance resulted in an eight-count indictment and conviction
for interstate gambling.
While the parties briefed the issue of whether law enforcement officials had penetrated a constitutionally protected area
by monitoring the public phone booth, the Court “decline[d]
to adopt this formulation of the issues.” 45
In a doctrinal shift, the
Court brushed aside the
“eroded” 46 underpinnings of Olmstead and
Goldman. Instead the
majority, without articulating a clear test,
established that law enforcement agents had
indeed violated Katz’s
Fourth Amendment
rights. The Court has
since adopted the test
Justice Harlan proposed
in his concurrence for
determining the breach
of an individual’s rights: “[F]irst that a person have exhibited
an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is objectively prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”47
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III. AN EXPLORATION OF MODERN SEARCH AND
SEIZURE DOCTRINE
At its most basic, the Fourth Amendment establishes a procedural requirement. It does not prohibit searches and seizures
altogether, only those searches and seizures that are unreasonable.48 To obtain a warrant, law enforcement is required to provide an oath, reasonable cause, and particularity with respect
to the areas law enforcement seeks to search or the contraband
they seek to seize.49 Of the six fundamental questions (who,
what, when, where, why, how), the Fourth Amendment is most
concerned with how. It asks law enforcement: How did you
obtain the proffered evidence?

A. THE SEARCH PRONG OF THE MODERN
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to presumptively bar searches conducted without a warrant.50 While there are problems with this approach,51 a warrant
forces the police to “make a record before [rather than after a]
39

search.”52 A search, however, is not always a search53 and has
instead become a legal term of art. The first question involves
defining which searches implicate the Fourth Amendment,
thereby activating the warrant requirement. Originally, as we
have seen, the police only conducted a search when their actions
involved trespass or physical penetration of a protected space
such as a home or office.
More recently, commentators and the Court alike have
struggled to articulate a precise definition of searches implicating Fourth Amendment concerns. The inability to define a
search has led to erratic and sometimes contradictory interpretations of the Amendment.54 Indeed, even the author of the current
jurisprudential test, Justice Harlan, later expressed reservations
regarding the test he developed.55 Consistent themes, however,
do emerge from the case law, which in turn informs the contours
of the search definition.

1. Testing Subjective Expectations and Objective
Reasonableness
First, the Court looks for evidence that an individual has
manifested a subjective desire “to preserve something as private.”56 In assessing subjective expectations, the Court considers the manner in which a person has used a particular location
and whether they utilized the precautions customarily taken
by those seeking privacy.57 A sincere desire for privacy, however, is not enough. Because a personal desire for privacy may
be “‘conditioned’ by influences alien to [established] Fourth
Amendment”58 boundaries, the Court has observed an objective
component to the test.59
The objective element of the test considers whether “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’ the right to privacy
asserted by the individual.”60 As might be expected, the Court
has placed more emphasis on the objective, rather than subjective, prong of the inquiry. At the same time, the Court has not
“explicitly defined the precise factors that render a subjective
expectation objectively reasonable.”61 For some, this reluctance
indicates that the Court is simply “substituti[ng] . . . words for
analysis” and objectivity.62 A survey of the Court’s decisions,
however, does provide some practical guidance. The Court has
considered how an individual uses a certain location,63 whether
“precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy”64
were taken, and whether the Framers contemplated the particular type of intrusion.65 Furthermore, in its analysis of enhanced
surveillance techniques, the Court inquires as to the intrusiveness of law enforcement’s encroachment into personal zones.
Two types of intrusiveness are relevant to the Court’s inquiry.66
I. What Type of Information Does the Technology
Provide?
Just as the Fourth Amendment asks how law enforcement
obtained its evidence, the Court, in its treatment of enhanced
40

surveillance technologies, asks how the technology works. The
Court has delineated two types of technologies based on its jurisprudence. On one hand, the Court has categorized as “sense
augmenting” any technology that reveals information that could
theoretically be attained using any of the five human senses.
This technology typically falls into the category of a mechanical
substitute or enhancement of human senses. On the other hand,
the Court has designated as “extrasensory” technology that provides details that the human senses alone could not deduce.
Two decisions illustrate the Court’s treatment of sense augmenting technology. First, in Smith, the Court permitted law
enforcement’s use of a pen register, which they described as
mere sense augmentation. The Court explained that a device
“disclos[ing] only the telephone numbers that have been dialed”
did not indicate that a search had occurred.67 It reasoned that “[t]
he switching equipment that processed those numbers is merely
the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day,
personally completed calls for the subscriber.”68 Because the
pen register failed to disclose the content of the telephone call,
the identities of the parties, and “whether the call was even completed,” the Court concluded that the search did not implicate
the Fourth Amendment.69
Later, in United States v. Knotts, the Court considered a
technology unrelated to telephony. There the Court classified as
sense augmenting a beeper placed in a barrel of chloroform that
was later sold to the defendant. The beeper in question was a
relatively unsophisticated tracking device emitting a weak radio
signal, enabling law enforcement to follow it using a receiver.70
The beeper did not telegraph its actual location, only the relative distance between the receiver and the beeper. The signal
became stronger as the receiver moved closer to the beeper, and
became weaker when moved further away.71 During its analysis of the objective prong of the Katz two-part test, the Court
evaluated the intrusiveness of the beeper. At several points, the
Court noted that the beeper did not reveal information that could
not otherwise be discovered through unaided observation.72 The
Court also analogized use of the beeper to “the following of an
automobile on public streets and highways.”73 Consequently,
the Court concluded that use of the beeper constituted sense
augmenting technology, which did not qualify as a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes.
In contrast, the Court generally issues greater privacy
protections when addressing cases involving extrasensory
technology. Indeed, the case law suggests that extrasensory surveillance is almost per se prohibited without a warrant.74 Kyllo
v. United States stands in contrast to the Court’s often permissive attitude towards sense augmenting technology. In this case,
federal agents suspected that Kyllo was growing marijuana in
his home by using the high intensity lamps necessary for indoor
marijuana growth.75 Using a thermal imaging device, the agents
scanned the outer walls of Kyllo’s home for differences in the
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amount of heat emanating from different parts of the house. The
device indicated that there was more heat emanating from the
garage and side wall than from other areas of the house. Based
on this information, the agents secured a warrant and searched
the home, finding marijuana plants. At trial, Kyllo moved to
suppress the evidence, and the question of whether the use of a
thermal imaging device constituted a search eventually reached
the Supreme Court.
The Court dismissed the argument that the thermal imager
did not reveal information about the house’s interior76 before
concluding that the imager constitutes an extrasensory device.77
By contrast, the dissenters found that use of the imager did
not constitute a search only after finding that it was a sense
augmenting device. Despite the Court’s ostensible rejection of
formalistic application of the Fourth Amendment,78 both the
majority and dissent opted for slightly mechanical interpretations. For both, their analyses ended after categorization of the
technology as either sense augmenting or extrasensory.
II. How Much Information Does the Technology Expose?
In addition to the type of technology used, the Court has
consistently considered the quantity of information revealed by
surveillance technology. In Katz, the Court was guided by the
degree of intrusion associated with eavesdropping. The device
broadcasted not only the volume or number dialed, but also the
“words . . . utter[ed] into the mouthpiece.”79 In contrast, the
Court has declined to extend Fourth Amendment protections
when faced with a lesser intrusion in similar circumstances.80
Furthermore, the Court looked beyond the quantity of information revealed by the beeper in Knotts and also noted that the type
of surveillance practiced by law enforcement vis-à-vis beeper
technology did not constitute “dragnet” surveillance.81 The
Court cautioned that its opinion should not be read as authorizing “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen . . . without
judicial knowledge or supervision.”82
Similarly, in Dow Chemical Co v. United States the Court
considered whether aerial photography of an industrial plant
constituted an unreasonable search.83 After quickly concluding
that the photography revealed nothing more than a mild augmentation of “a simple flyover with naked-eye observation,”84
the Court considered the amount of detail contained in the photographs. The Court reasoned that because “no objects as small
as ½ inch in diameter, such as a class ring, for example” were
identifiable, no “serious privacy concerns” were raised.85 Based
on its considerations of both the type and quantity of information revealed, the Court concluded that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.86 The Court cautioned, however,
that methods providing more detail indeed might trigger Fourth
Amendment concerns.87
These cases demonstrate the Supreme Court’s consistent
practice of considering the quantity of information revealed by
Criminal Law Brief

surveillance technology and the type of intrusiveness involved.
Both Knotts and Dow Chemical Co. involved sense augmenting
technology typically unfettered by Fourth Amendment restrictions. Yet in both cases, the Court indicated there are limits to
the use of even this type of technology. That limit is calibrated
by the quantity of information revealed.
Therefore, for the protections of the Fourth Amendment to
apply, an individual’s exhibited desire to keep something private must complement a general societal interest in keeping it
private. Where law enforcement employs the use of enhanced
surveillance techniques, the Court will consider both the type
and quantity of intrusion when determining society’s interest
in keeping something private. This standard is instructive in assessing how lower federal courts and state courts have grappled
with issues of GPS technology.

B. STATE AND LOWER FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
REGARDING THE USE OF GPS TECHNOLOGY
The treatment of this issue by lower courts is decidedly
mixed. To date, three Federal Circuits88 and four state Supreme
Courts have directly addressed this issue. Three of these courts
have determined that the use of GPS devices does not constitute
a search, with four others finding the opposite. The courts finding that no search has occurred based their analysis on Knotts,
whereas the courts finding that a search had occurred bypassed
accepted Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Collectively, Wisconsin, the Seventh, and the Ninth Circuits do not consider the use of GPS devices to be a search. Each
court found Knotts to be controlling. For example, Judge Posner
in United States v. Garcia briefly considered the technological advancement of GPS’ only to conclude that it represented
a “modest improvement” over beeper technology.89 Brushing
past those concerns, he concluded that because there was no
evidence that law enforcement was, in fact engaging in mass
surveillance, the use of GPS technology by law enforcement
officers who “have a suspect in their sights,” raised no constitutional concerns.90 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Pineda-Moreno perceived no distinction between short- and
long-term surveillance.91
These courts have ignored the difference between GPS
and beeper technology and instead accepted that one tracking
technology is analogous to another. They considered only the
fruits of the technology rather than the method (the “how”) of
procurement. Those courts finding that a search has occurred,
on the other hand, considered the issue more thoroughly. Unfortunately, their analysis can be of limited value because it is not
rooted in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Largely, only state supreme courts have found the use of
GPS devices to constitute a search, basing their reasoning in
state rather than federal, law. The only federal circuit to find that
the use of GPS devices constituted a search did not fully ground
41

its reasoning in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Rather, the
D.C. Circuit looked partially to the “mosaic theory” invoked
in cases involving national security and California state law to
justify its decision.92
For example, the Washington Supreme Court first considered the issue of GPS technology in Washington v. Jackson.93
Law enforcement obtained a 10-day warrant to attach GPS devices to two of Jackson’s vehicles. The devices eventually led
authorities to his daughter’s body, which was buried in a remote
area of the forest. A jury later convicted Jackson of murder. The
Washington Supreme Court considered the appellate court’s assertion that “installation and use of GPS devices on vehicles
[did] not constitute a search or seizure” under the Washington State
Constitution.94 The court held that
observing items exposed to the
public does not constitute a search
even when using “particularly intrusive method[s] of viewing.”95
The court continued, noting that the
“nature and extent of information
obtained” was relevant when considering whether an expectation of
privacy is reasonable.96 Despite relying on state law and precedent the
Jackson court also considered both
of the intrusiveness factors implicit
in a Fourth Amendment analysis,
concluding that the intrusion of
GPS devices was sufficient to merit
warrant protection.97
New York courts also recently considered this issue in New
York v. Weaver.98 There, police attached a GPS device, for no
discernable reason,99 to the defendant’s vehicle. Evidence from
the GPS device was later used to show that the defendant was
present at a K-Mart around the time it was burgled. A jury convicted the defendant of burgling the K-Mart based in part on the
GPS evidence. The court rested its decision to classify the use of
the GPS device as a search on many arguments. First, it found
that GPS technology differed significantly from “primitive”
beeper technology.100 Skipping over the subjective requirement,
the court then cited to several cases asserting the existence of a
reasonable expectation of privacy on the open road.101 Finally,
the court referenced both intrusiveness factors, concluding that
GPS devices contain “sophisticated and powerful technology”
which provides more than a “mere enhancement of human sensory capacity.”102 In other words, the court concluded that GPS
devices provide a fantastic quantity of information that would
not otherwise be available to the five human senses. Despite
considering the case primarily under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the court acknowledged that federal law in this area is

not settled and that this issue has not been addressed by the majority of federal courts. It therefore rested its decision on state
rather than federal law.
Most recently in 2010, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the issue of GPS tracking in United States v. Maynard. There law enforcement tracked the suspect, Antoine Jones,
for over a month without a warrant. Information provided by the
GPS device placed on his car was used to arrest and convict
him for drug-related crimes. After distinguishing the case from
Knotts because of its lengthy surveillance period, the court concluded that Jones’s movements were not “actually exposed to
the public because the likelihood anyone will observe all those
movements is effectively nil.”103 In
reaching this conclusion, the D.C.
Circuit considered what a reasonable person would expect another to
do. In so doing, it ignored the precedent set by the Supreme Court in
Knotts and Karo that required lower
courts to focus on the information
that can be theoretically, rather
than reasonably, acquired by visual
surveillance.104
Furthermore, the court examined which movements of Jones
were constructively exposed.105
When considering the constructive
exposure issue, however, the court
did not rely on any Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Instead, it cited
primarily to a FOIA case and the mosaic theory, which the government often invoked in cases involving national security.106
Neither FOIA nor mosaic theory has its roots in the Fourth
Amendment. Its only reference to any Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was its token referral to Smith v. Maryland, in which
it found implicit support for its position.107
Courts take widely differing approaches to the use of GPS
devices but share one characteristic: their focus on the search
prong of the Fourth Amendment. These differing approaches
have predictably led to differing standards and conclusions. Ultimately, Maynard is the exception that proves existing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence does not consider the use of GPS
devices to constitute a search. Privacy advocates would thus do
better to seek protection under the seizure prong.
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C. THE MODERN SEIZURE CLAUSE
In terms of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, seizures are
the bridesmaids to a search’s bride.108 Defendants typically challenge the search itself rather than the seizure of items taken
during the search. Seizures are generally the by-product of a
prior search; after all, how else would law enforcement stumble
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upon the contraband?109 As a result, the seizure jurisprudence is
far less developed than the search jurisprudence. Nevertheless,
the two prongs of the Fourth Amendment protect the same interests: privacy, property, and liberty.110 Despite the perception
that search primarily protects privacy111 and seizure mainly protects property and liberty,112 significant overlap exists between
the two. Indeed, both are instrumental in enforcing the Fourth
Amendment’s safeguards.113
Like searches, seizures of personal property without a warrant are considered per se unreasonable, and the question of
Fourth Amendment protection turns on the definition of seizure.114 Also like search, the term “seizure” has become a term
of art. Here, however, the similarities end. For the most part, the
courts have articulated and applied a singular, coherent definition for what constitutes a seizure. As is the case with most
constitutional issues, there is some discussion and tension regarding the test and its scope, but seizure does not arouse the
same level of interpretive difficulties, passion, or commentary
as the search prong. “A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there
is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory
interests in that property.”115 Application of this standard reveals
the analytical framework pertinent to the seizure analysis. The
Court conducts a three-part test to determine first whether a
seizure occurred and next, whether that seizure was reasonable.

1. There Must Be a Possessory Interest at Stake
First, the Court requires that a possessory interest be at
stake. For example, in Jacobsen, Federal Express employees
noticed white powder spilling out of a damaged package.116
They notified DEA officials who, after conducting a field test
on a trace amount, determined that the powder was cocaine.117
The DEA agents obtained a warrant and arrested the respondents at the recipient’s residence.118 At trial, the defendants challenged several aspects of the DEA’s conduct; most important to
the seizure analysis was their challenge to the field test of the
powder.119 The Court found that the DEA’s actions implicated a
property interest because the defendants had a property interest
in the white powder.
Despite the requirement of a possessory interest, the Court
is mindful that seizures can impact any of the interests protected
by the Fourth Amendment: liberty, privacy, or property. United
States v. Place is an example of the Court recognizing that the
liberty interest, coupled with a nominal possessory interest, may
trigger seizure concerns.120 In Place, DEA officials detained an
airline passenger for ninety minutes while they conducted a
“sniff test” on his luggage. The Court found that the detention
“effectively restrain[ed] the [passenger because] he is subjected
to the possible disruption of his travel plans in order to remain
with his luggage or to arrange for its return.”121 The Court found
that this detention and the resulting infringement upon the passenger’s liberty interests constituted a seizure of the individual.
Criminal Law Brief

I. The Possessory Interest is Not Limited to Tangible Items
Traditionally, seizure denies physical possession or enjoyment of a physical item to all others. In other words, seizure is
typically concerned with the actual confiscation of a physical
item.122 The Supreme Court has, on occasion, recognized that
Fourth Amendment seizure law also provides for a possessory
interest in intangible items, such as their words. In Berger v.
New York, the Court ruled that the recording of a human voice
is a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.123 Any possessory
interest one has in one’s voice is intangible. The language of
the majority opinion clarified that the wiretaps constituted both
a seizure and a search.124 The Court reaffirmed their stance in
Katz, stating that “the Fourth Amendment governs not only the
seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording
of oral statements . . . .”125 The Court unambiguously stated
that “the Government’s activities in electronically listening to
and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and
thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.”126
Additionally, federal appellate courts have acknowledged
that intangible privacy interests are also protected under the
seizure prong. Both the Second and D.C. Circuits have observed this right in the context of considering photographs
as seizures.127 Ayeni I is particularly instructive on this point.
There, law enforcement officials attempted to execute a warrant
against Babatunde Ayendi for credit card fraud. The agents were
accompanied at all times by a CBS television crew. The crew
filmed every second of the intrusion from the agents “push[ing]
[Mrs. Ayeni] in the chest” to her interrogation at the hands of
the agents and the crying of Ayeni’s son.128 The Second Circuit ruled that the “video and sound recordings were seizures
under the Fourth Amendment” because they seized “images
and sounds of the Ayeni home, and of the Ayenis themselves,”
broadcasting them “for public viewing by television audiences
across the country.”129 The court indicated that it recognized the
serious privacy interest in the sanctity of the home and in the individuals themselves, which were infringed upon by the seizure
of images and sounds of their homes and persons. These outliers notwithstanding, courts traditionally have been reluctant to
extend Fourth Amendment seizure protections to intangible or
virtual property.130

2. The Government Must Interfere With the Interest
After identifying the interest at stake, the Court considers
whether the government has interfered with that interest. The
government has interfered with a possessory interest when it exerts “dominion and control” over it.131 In Jacobsen, DEA agents
took a trace amount of the white powder out of the package and
then tested it. By manipulating the powder, the agents exerted
dominion and control over it. The testing of the powder “con43

verted . . . a temporary deprivation of possessory interests into
a permanent one.”1 A permanent deprivation, however, is not
always necessary to satisfy this standard. In Place, a deprivation
of liberty for ninety minutes was sufficient.133
Furthermore, even deprivation of the interest is not required. In United States v. Va Lerie, after a careful consideration of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the seizure standard also prohibited the “government’s conversion of an individual’s private property.”134 The
Va Lerie court was careful to distinguish conversion from mere
trespass as requiring “an intent to exercise a dominion or control
over the goods which is in fact inconsistent with the [owner’s]
rights” and noting that “the gist of conversion is the interference
with control of the [owner’s] property.”135

3. The Court Balances the Intrusion against the
Governmental Interests

not require opening the luggage[,] does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden”143 and which
“discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.”144 Despite the fact that the sniff conveys information, the intrusiveness itself is limited, ensuring that the owner
is not subject to embarrassment and inconvenience. Contrast a
dog sniff to the seizure in Place where authorities intruded upon
both possessory and liberty interests. Law enforcement severely
intruded on Place’s liberty interest by subjecting him to “the coercive atmosphere of a custodial confinement.”145 Furthermore,
the Court established a spectrum when assessing the intrusion
into possessory interests. The intrusion is less severe when the
individual “has relinquished control of the property to a third
party” or when the government confines its investigation to an
“on-the-spot inquiry.”146 By contrast, when an individual retains
control of their possession and the government transports their
property elsewhere, the intrusiveness is more severe.

If both of the preceding questions are answered in the affirmative, the Court then “balance[s] the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to
justify the intrusion.”136 The Court conducted its most prominent balancing act in Terry v. Ohio. There the Court described
at least three governmental interests to be considered: effective
crime prevention, investigating crime, and the need to ensure
that a suspect is not armed.137 At the same time, the Court recognized that the seizure of an individual was no “petty indignity” and represented a “serious intrusion upon the sanctity of
the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong
resentment.”138 Despite the intensity of the intrusion, the Court
determined that its scope was limited,139 concluding that the
weighty governmental interests balanced out the intrusion of
the seizure. Nevertheless, the Court carefully calibrated its language to limit the scope of its own holding, emphasizing that
each case turned on its own set of facts, while limiting the detention authority of an officer only to limited intrusions and
only when based on reasonable, articulable suspicion.140 The
Court has not circumscribed the factors they examined to determine the “nature and quality” of the intrusion, but the case
law indicates the factors that have guided the Court’s seizure
inquiry in the past.

II. The Duration of the Seizure is also Germane to the
Court’s Analysis
The other salient factor in the Court’s balancing analysis
is the duration of the seizure. In Place, a detention for ninety
minutes was enough for the Court to conclude that the seizure
was unreasonable. Indeed, the Court implied that the length of
the detention itself provided sufficient grounds for finding the
seizure unreasonable.147 In comparison, when faced with an
interference with possessory interests, the Court has permitted delays of up to twenty-nine hours.148 Brevity, however,
is not always a determining factor. In Jacobsen, DEA officials
permanently destroyed the white powder they were testing.149
Nevertheless, because the scope of the intrusion was so trivial150
the Court concluded that the agent’s actions were reasonable.
Hence, for the Court to find that a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred, it must find that the government meaningfully interfered with a protected interest. If such interference
implicates the Fourth Amendment, the Court then will assess
the reasonableness of the seizure. Primary in the Court’s analysis are 1) the interests of law enforcement in effecting the seizure and 2) the manner in which they conduct the seizure. If the
intrusiveness or scope of the seizure cannot be justified by law
enforcement’s interests, then the seizure is unreasonable.

I. The Court looks to the Intrusiveness of the
Government’s Seizure
The first factor is the intrusiveness of the government’s
seizure. As the Court noted in Place, “intrusion . . . occasioned
by a seizure of one’s personal effects can vary both in its nature
and extent.”141 Moreover, seizures reasonable at inception “can
nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment because its manner
of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests.”142 At
the low end of the intrusion spectrum is a dog sniff, which “does
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4. Intersection of Fourth Amendment and First
Amendment
The use of GPS devices, however, raises not only Fourth
Amendment concerns. GPS devices are used principally to track
individuals, to uncover where they travel to, and, using this
information, to solve crimes. Sometimes, as in Jackson, GPS
devices are used when police already have information that a
crime occurred and are using such devices to fill the gaps in
their information. Other times, as in Garcia, the police suspect
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that the individual will commit a crime. Police can then use the
GPS device to establish whether a potential suspect was at the
scene of the crime when it actually occurs. But the devices are
not intelligent; instead they are merely passive, relaying a set of
coordinates or an address. The latitude and longitude provided
by GPS devices represent more than a physical address. Locations are a proxy for the people and businesses they represent.
Therefore, more than mere locations, GPS devices provide an
index of known associates and associations and insight into the
frequency of those associations. The attachment of a GPS device, then, implicates fundamental First Amendment freedom of
association concerns.151
The Constitution protects freedom of association from state
intrusion in two ways: 1) the Court protects the “choices to enter
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships;” and
2) the Court recognizes the right to
engage in those activities protected
by the First Amendment: speech,
assembly, petition of the redress of
grievances, and the exercise of religion.152 The government’s actions
do not have to directly trigger First
Amendment freedom of association
concerns. Instead the Court proscribes government action that has
the effect of discouraging or potentially limiting the free exercise of
First Amendment protections, but
which are unintended to affect association.153 Additionally, the Court
has not hesitated to restrict government action even where the “governmental action challenged may
appear to be totally unrelated to protected liberties.”154
First Amendment protections extend only to constitutionally protected speech and associations. The Court has, however,
found that First Amendment protections with respect to the freedom to associate are quite broad. Indeed, the First Amendment
protects the right to “associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends.”155 The Court has unequivocally stated that
the First Amendment protects the “formation and preservation
of . . . highly personal relationships” from “unjustified interference by the State.”156 Moreover, the Court recognizes that
“the constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects
the realization that individuals draw much of their emotional
enrichment from close ties with others.”157 Implicit in protecting
these relationships is the “ability independently to define one’s
identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”158

Government infringement on these guaranteed freedoms
could take “a number of forms.”159 Several of these forms are
pertinent to the use of GPS devices. At a basic level, the use of
GPS devices inevitably interferes with the formation and preservation of personal relationships because it threatens to reveal
not only political and religious affiliations but also undermines
an individual’s independent establishment of identity. More seriously, it threatens to forcibly disclose the fact of group membership. Most importantly, the use of GPS devices threatens to
chill the fundamental First Amendment freedom to associate.
Under constant threat of GPS surveillance individuals may be
less likely to attend political rallies or undergo medical treatment such as psychological evaluation. Under the specter of
relentless tracking, individuals may also be less likely to engage
in the religious and social associations that the First Amendment expressly protects.
The point of this discussion is
not to argue that GPS devices inevitably trample on First Amendment
concerns. Whether the use of a GPS
device implicates the right to association turns on the facts and circumstances of the individual case.
It is irrelevant that there might be a
narrow and wholly unrealistic case
where the police affix a GPS device
to a car whose owner uses it solely
for criminal purposes. Critically,
the use of GPS devices constantly
and inevitably threatens to reveal
and chill associations protected by
the First Amendment: the “formation and preservation of highly personal relationships” or social, political, or religious associations
that an individual seeks to protect from government scrutiny
and interference. The use of GPS devices raises the concern
that the information provided by these devices intrudes on First
Amendment protections.
These First Amendment concerns fundamentally alter the
Fourth Amendment inquiry.160 Where searches or seizure implicate both the Fourth Amendment161 and the First Amendment,
the Fourth Amendment is applied with “scrupulous exactitude.”162 In particular, the “[c]ourts will scrutinize any large
scale seizure of . . . materials presumptively protected under the
First Amendment.”163 Having evaluated the current state of both
the search and seizure doctrines, this Article will now consider
whether the use of GPS devices falls under either category.

The attachment of a GPS
device, then, implicates
fundamental First

Amendment freedom of
association concerns
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IV. THE CHALLENGES OF CONSIDERING
GPS TECHNOLOGY A SEARCH UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court has not yet opined on the status of GPS
technology. The case for considering the use of GPS technology
to be a search ignores the assorted obstacles presented by both
the relevant jurisprudence and its application at both the federal
and state levels.

A. THE BEEPER CASES ARE NOT ANALOGOUS TO
THE USE OF GPS DEVICES
The first obstacle in considering the typical GPS case164
is to remove it from the ambit of Knotts. In Knotts, the police
knew that Armstrong had purchased the ingredients to create
illicit drugs. The police, with the consent of the seller of the
ingredients, arranged to place a beeper in the container sold
to Armstrong. The beeper emitted a signal monitored by a receiver; the strength of the signal indicated the distance between
the two. A stronger signal meant that the receiver was closer
to the beeper and vice versa. When visual surveillance failed,
the police used the beeper to find Armstrong’s vehicle. The defense in Knotts later moved to suppress the evidence given the
warrantless monitoring of the beeper, but the Supreme Court
rejected this argument.
Every court that considers the warrantless use of GPS devices begins its analysis with Knotts. Both involve leveraging
technology to supplement surveillance of an individual’s movements in public spaces. Despite the striking similarities between
the two, the language of Knotts suggests that it should not control the decision reached in a GPS case. Most importantly, the
Court warned that Knotts should not extend to precisely the scenario created by the use of GPS devices. Faced with the argument that Knotts would lead to “dragnet-type law enforcement
practices,” the Court distinguished between the type of surveillance conducted in that case and “twenty-four hour surveillance
of any citizen of this country . . . without judicial knowledge
or supervision.”165 GPS technology enables what beepers could
not—the flawless, uninterrupted, and twenty-four hour tracking
of a suspect. Even if the Court could not have anticipated this
particular technology, they could anticipate the consequences
of such emerging technologies. The Court expressly declined
to extend the holding of Knotts to that scenario.
Moreover, law enforcement’s use of GPS devices differs
significantly from its use of beeper technology. The implementation of the various technologies varies as greatly as does the
underlying technology itself. Beeper technology is hardly more
sophisticated than playing Marco Polo.166 The nature of beeper
technology forces the police to physically follow the individuals
they suspect of wrongdoing. The beeper does not transmit its
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actual location; rather it transmits only its location relative to
the receiver. GPS technology, on the other hand, involves the simultaneous use of several satellites to pinpoint one’s location.167
Initially designed for military use, it has only recently been declassified and has consistently become more accurate. The difference between the two is as stark as the difference between
smoke signals and cellular technology for communication.
Their implementation reflects the relative sophistication of
the technologies. Beepers are pure tracking devices enabling
only one thing—visual surveillance. GPS technology, on the
other hand, enables law enforcement to forego actual surveillance and track the movements of a suspect over long stretches
of time.168 Rather than actively transmitting their location, GPS
devices are passive, reading information from various satellites
and in turn facilitating a new perception of the world. Previously law enforcement used beeper technology in their attempt
to catch individuals during the commission of a crime. Now,
they use GPS technology ex post, without any particularized
suspicion.169
The differences in the technology and implementation indicate that GPS devices are not tracking devices and should not
be treated as such. For these reasons, the Court should recognize
that the holding in Knotts does not automatically dispose of a
GPS case. With this obstacle surmounted, the next challenge
arises when considering the use of GPS technology under the
Court’s two-part Katz test.

B. THERE IS NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN ONE’S MOVEMENTS ALONG PUBLIC
THOROUGHFARES
An individual traveling in public surrenders some of the
privacy protections afforded to other aspects of everyday life.
While other areas of life allow us to demonstrate a desire for
privacy, travel in public, particularly by automobile, is easily
visible.

1. An Individual Cannot Demonstrate a Subjective
Desire for Privacy
The first consideration is an individual’s demonstrated subjective desire for privacy. It should be noted that the Court does
not emphasize this prong of the test. A demonstrated personal
desire for privacy is not as important as the second, objective
consideration. This desire for privacy, however, must still exist
and be discernable, which is problematic. It is difficult to imagine how a car owner might express a subjective desire for privacy in the physical movements of his vehicle. Ironically, any
evasive action a driver might take to shed surveillance can be
presented as sufficient probable cause to justify a warrant permitting the very type of surveillance the driver sought to evade.
In Katz, the Court found that an individual exhibited a
subjective desire for privacy after occupying a telephone booth
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and “shut[ting] the door behind him.”170 Responding to the government’s argument that the booth itself was glass, enabling
passers-by to see Katz and thus detracting from his privacy,
the Court stated that what Katz wanted to “exclude from the
booth” was not the eye, but the uninvited ear. Shutting the door
does not exclude an uninvited eye from seeing where the car is
going. It is unclear how a person may convey that they value the
privacy of the movements of a car that are after all, visible to the
public. There is, of course, some difference between an expectation that one can be seen on the open road and an expectation
that one will be followed on the open road. One does not beget
the other. This idea, however, does not speak to subjective but
rather to objective concerns.

2. Society Does Not Recognize the Desire to Keep
Private One’s Movements on Public
Thoroughfares
The objective prong of the Katz two-part test asks what
society considers to be a reasonable desire to retain information
as private. Long before the advent of GPS devices and satellite surveillance, the Supreme Court recognized that individuals
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in their vehicles.171 Individuals, however, possess a lesser expectation of privacy on the open road than they do in their homes or offices.172
Despite this general expectation of privacy on the open road,
the Court forcefully rejected the notion that an individual may
have any reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements
along public thoroughfares.173 The Court instead asserted that
because an individual voluntarily conveys the fact of whatever
stops are made, they cannot claim privacy in the movements of
their car.174
i. GPS Devices Are Not Intrusive Enough
Privacy advocates look to the intrusiveness inquiry for protection. They maintain that GPS technology represents an unprecedented encroachment into personal areas. This technology
has the potential to compile a comprehensive profile of where
you go, with whom you associate, and what you carry.175 On
one hand, GPS devices provide a tremendous amount of information. On the other, it is most readily classified as a sense
augmenting rather than extrasensory device.176
Notwithstanding the judgments of the state courts to address the issue,177 GPS technology does not provide any information that is unavailable to the five human senses. While the
device does not provide visual imagery, it does communicate
only information that the human eye could perceive on its own.
A GPS device only reveals information that could have been
attained through visual surveillance.178 The Supreme Court has
indicated through its decisions in Knotts and Karo that its analysis focuses on whether the information could have been attained
using only visual surveillance and not whether it is practically
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possible to have done so.179 It is, of course, theoretically possible for a police department to “hir[e] another 10 million police
officers to tail every vehicle on the nation’s roads.”180
In Dow Chemical Co., the Court emphasized that sense
augmenting technology might be unconstitutional if it provides
too much detail.181 Realistically, the amount of detail that can be
provided by GPS technology is truly stunning. A GPS provides
real time location information with an accuracy of ten to fifteen
centimeters.182 This quantity of information leads some commentators to claim that it “merits defining use of the technology
a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”183 This claim
ignores the differences between the quantity of information at
stake in Dow Chemical Co. and GPS use. In Dow Chemical Co.,
the Court implied that cameras providing greater detail might
implicate more serious privacy concerns. The added accuracy
was critical because it provided more information to law enforcement. If we were to graph the relationship between accuracy and privacy with respect to aerial photography, it would
demonstrate an inverse linear relationship. The more detail the
cameras provided, the less privacy an individual could retain.
Therefore, cameras providing facial details erode privacy and
cameras providing even minute details as small as a class ring
erode one’s sense of privacy even more.
By contrast, enhanced accuracy in GPS devices, after a certain point, does not implicate greater privacy concerns. Whether
the devices are accurate to ten centimeters, one meter, or ten
meters is largely irrelevant. Of course, some level of accuracy
is necessary. The level of accuracy needed, however, is quite
low. Beepers are both unsophisticated and imprecise and have
been used successfully by law enforcement for years before
the invention of GPS devices. Unlike the relationship between
cameras and privacy, the relationship between GPS devices and
privacy represents an upside down plateau. With accuracy on
the x-axis and privacy on the y-axis, privacy decreases as accuracy increases. It does so, however, only to a point, after which
the marginal loss in privacy is quite low and the graph levels as
accuracy increases.
The Court can make a number of arguments against classifying the use of GPS technology as a search. If it does not
dispense with the argument perfunctorily under Knotts, the
Court will struggle to discern a subjective expectation of privacy from the individual. Even if an individual were to somehow divine a way to exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy
in the movements of his automobile, the Court will struggle
to identify a corresponding objective expectation as reflected
in society. GPS technology provides detailed, intimate profiles
of our lives, the profiles of which are inherently public. The
information revealed by GPS devices allows law enforcement
to passively track our movements with pinpoint accuracy, yet
none of these actions implicate constitutional concerns. Law
enforcement simply becomes more efficient with the activities
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they have conducted for millennia. This type of advancement is
one that the Supreme Court has been loath to obstruct.184

V. THE USE OF GPS DEVICES
CONSTITUTES A SEIZURE
Privacy advocates need not force consideration of GPS devices into a search paradigm. After all, the Fourth Amendment
protects against both unreasonable searches and unreasonable
seizures. Shelter from the warrantless use of GPS devices lies
in the protections against unlawful
seizures enshrined in the Fourth
Amendment, but is rarely applied.
It should be noted that the Court in
Karo has already held that the use
of a beeper did not constitute a seizure. The Justices’ cursory analysis
reasoned that at most a technical
trespass occurred which did not
meaningfully interfere with one’s
possessory interest in a vehicle.
The following discussion illustrates
the flaws with this cursory analysis, echoed most recently by Judge
Posner in Garcia (which failed to
even apply the seizure test). The
majority’s analysis of this issue was
strictly conclusory. Rather than explain why attaching a beeper to a
vehicle did not constitute a seizure,
the majority simply stated that a
beeper did not impair any privacy
interests.185 The dissent presented
a more forceful and coherent argument, recognizing that attachment
of a beeper converted the vehicle into an informant for the
police.186
Admittedly, it is somewhat counterintuitive to classify the
use of a GPS device as a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
As Judge Posner succinctly articulated in Garcia:

gible items.188 Additionally, he betrays the application of the
wrong seizure standard. While Judge Posner did not articulate
precisely what test he was applying, his argument implied that
the use or enjoyment of an item must be impaired for a seizure
to implicate the Fourth Amendment. Instead, in order to find a
seizure, the Supreme Court only required that the government
exercise dominion and control over an item, not that law enforcement impair the use or enjoyment of an item.
Both failures have their root in the same cause. Seizure, as
applied to the Fourth Amendment, primarily revolves around
the actual seizure of physical items.189 Where the actual seizure of physical items is concerned,
exercising “dominion and control”
over an item and impairing the “use
and enjoyment” of property are the
same. For instance, when a law
enforcement officer seizes white
powder suspected to be a narcotic,
he or she simultaneously exercises
dominion and control over the powder while denying its use and enjoyment to its owner.
The digital age has confounded
this fundamental conception of seizure. Information previously stored
physically in files and filing cabinets is now stored electronically.
Technology now enables the virtual
seizure of virtual items. The seizure
of a computer file does not deny its
use or enjoyment to others, hence,
virtual seizure.
The use of GPS devices does
not go quite so far. Instead, the use
of GPS devices constitutes the virtual seizure (as use of the car is not
denied to the owner) of physical property (the vehicle itself).
Something intangible is taken from a vehicle’s owner when a
GPS device is placed on it—liberty and privacy. In this way,
the use of a GPS device is not unlike copyright and plagiarism.
Copyright vests ownership in words; the words themselves become property of their copyright owner. When the possessory
interest in the copyright is violated, something intangible has
been taken.190 Fortunately, the existing seizure jurisprudence is
flexible enough to address the issues raised by GPS devices.

Even if an individual were
to somehow divine a way
to exhibit a subjective

expectation of privacy

in the movements of his
automobile, the Court

will struggle to identify a
corresponding objective
expectation as reflected
in society.

The [GPS] device did not affect the car’s driving qualities, did not draw power from the car’s engine or battery, did not take up room that might otherwise have
been occupied by passengers or packages, did not even
alter the car’s appearance, and in short did not “seize”
the car in any intelligible sense of the word.187
His observations, while accurate, fail on two related counts.
First, he fails to acknowledge that the Fourth Amendment seizure doctrine recognizes that law enforcement can seize intan48

A. THERE IS A POSSESSORY INTEREST AT STAKE
First, the Court requires that a possessory interest be at
stake. It should be manifestly clear that an individual has a possessory interest in his vehicle. Moreover, the Supreme Court
has indicated that the Fourth Amendment recognizes the virtual
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seizure of virtual items.191 A wiretap constitutes a virtual seizure
(as the use of one’s voice is not denied to the individual) of a
virtual item (one’s voice is not a physical object). Much like the
CBS television crew in Ayendi I, GPS devices expose information that individuals rightly wish to keep private. This information includes religious affiliations, political leanings, and social
relationships. As in Ayendi I, the use of GPS devices implicates
the privacy of the individuals against whom it is used. In conjunction with the possessory right, the owner has a cognizable
privacy interest that is put at risk by the attachment of a GPS
device. More importantly, law enforcement asserts dominion
and control over a vehicle when they attach a GPS device to it.

B. THE GOVERNMENT EXERTS DOMINION AND
CONTROL OVER THE VEHICLE
After establishing that Fourth Amendment interests are
at stake, the Court requires that the government interfere with
those interests. With respect to their use of GPS devices, the
government does so in two separate ways. First, as the Jacobsen
Court explained, the government interferes with a possessory
interest when it exerts dominion and control over it.192 As Jacobsen illustrates, manipulation of an item constitutes dominion
and control over it. Second, according to Va Lerie, the seizure
standard prohibits the “government’s conversion of an individual’s private property.”193

1. The Attachment of a Foreign Object to One’s
Property Interferes with the Owner’s Basic
Possessory Rights
Ownership of “property implies the right of possession
and control” including the “right to protect and defend such
possession against the intrusion or trespass of others.”194
The owner of property has the “right to exclude from it all the
world, including the government, and a concomitant right to
use it exclusively for his own purposes.”195 That right includes
the prerogative to prohibit the attachment of foreign devices to
one’s property. The attachment of a GPS device to a car by law
enforcement officials defeats that basic right.

2. Attachment of a GPS Device Constitutes
Conversion
The intent to exercise dominion and control inconsistent
with the owner’s rights differentiates conversion from trespass.196 When the government attaches a GPS device to the car,
governmental officials transform the car from a mode of transportation into a messenger, conscripted into the ranks of the
government. More than a mere trespass,197 the officials have
moved the vehicle from its functional possession into the role
of an informant for the police. The government infringes on the
exclusionary property right by attaching an unwanted device
to the vehicle. Contrary to the conclusory opinion in Karo, the
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attachment of a GPS device does not constitute pure trespass.
It is a conversion of an individual’s car into a homing beacon,
constantly announcing itself to law enforcement: I am here.198
The Second Restatement of Torts adds another element to
the Eighth Circuit’s conception of conversion; the interfering
actor “may justly be required to pay the other the full value of
the chattel.”199 In order to determine the seriousness of the interference, the Second Restatement suggests looking to six factors:
1) the extent and duration of the actor’s exercise of dominion or control; 2) the actor’s intent to assert a right
in fact inconsistent with the other’s right of control; 3)
the actor’s good faith; 4) the extent and duration of the
resulting interference with the other’s right of control;
5) the harm done to the chattel; 6) the inconvenience
and expense caused to the other.200
The first five of these factors cut in favor of conversion. The
government’s dominion and control results in the interference
with the owners’ right of control over the vehicle for an extended duration.201 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that law enforcement does indeed intend to assert a
right inconsistent with the owners’ right of control when they
attach objects to an individual’s vehicle.202 As for the sixth factor, there is economic harm done to the vehicle. There is little
empirical research on the economic or market value of privacy,
but the existing research suggests that privacy, especially information privacy, does indeed have great value.203 For example,
one may imagine an auction in which two vehicles, identical
in all respects except one, are being sold. The only difference
between the two is that one of the vehicles has a governmentmonitored GPS device attached to it.204 It is difficult to imagine
both selling for the same price. For some, a car equipped with a
monitored GPS device would be worthless because of the value
placed on privacy. The inconvenience and expense caused to the
owner is debatable, but likely minimal.

C. BALANCING TEST
Under the definition articulated in the Court’s jurisprudence, this interference is not reasonable. The possessory interference is both highly intrusive and lengthy in duration. First,
the owner of the vehicle has not diluted his possessory interest
in his property by “relinquish[ing] control . . . to a third party”205
as did Jacobsen when he gave his package to Federal Express.206
Moreover, unlike the dog sniff in Chadwick, the intrusion of a
GPS device exposes more than simply incriminating information. It instead reveals an unparalleled amount of information
about the target—both personal and mundane, private and public. GPS devices enable the government to monitor an individual’s movements for twenty-four hours a day, and for weeks or
months at a time. All movements are recorded; there is no filter
for information relating solely to incriminating or explicit crimi49

nal activity. Every move, every turn is recorded. Use of the GPS
device perverts the fundamental concept of property, which
vests in its owner the right to exclude all others from it. The use
of a GPS device is somewhat like the deprivation of property
in Jacobsen where the deprivation was permanent.207 The Court
there found the scope of the intrusion to be trivial because only a
trace amount of the powder was destroyed. Here, however, law
enforcement is not taking a trace amount of the car, but rather
converting the entire possession for their purposes.
As in Jacobsen, the intrusion imposed by a GPS device is
extended in duration. Law enforcement can maintain their interference with an individual’s possessory interests in perpetuity.
They use GPS devices to help gather evidence to solve crimes.
One of two results is possible—either they solve the crime or
they do not. If they solve the crime, either they have caught the
individual they targeted with the GPS device (Targeted Person),
or they caught someone else (Actual Culprit). Where the Actual
Culprit is not the Targeted Person, law enforcement has no incentive to stop monitoring the Targeted Person. The device is
a sunk cost, and they can continue to gather information to use
retroactively should another crime be committed that they have
difficulty solving. The next time they have a “whodunit” on
their hands, they can simply access location information for all
individuals they have subjected to GPS surveillance and hope
for a positive match. In the third and final scenario, if law enforcement cannot solve the crime, the GPS device will live on
indefinitely, constantly transmitting information that authorities
hope will help them to solve the puzzle. In two out of these three
plausible scenarios, use of the GPS device is not only indefinite,
but also potentially permanent.
Finally, no interest of law enforcement supports the continuous, uninterrupted seizure of personal property. The only
law enforcement interest at stake is that in preventing and investigating crime. This interest, however, does not justify twentyfour hour seizure of an individual’s vehicle, particularly when
the owner may not even be suspected of a crime.208 While law
enforcement typically has a reason for following someone, they
have not always acted so scrupulously. In New York, authorities were unable to articulate their reason for following Mr.
Weaver.209 In both Jacobsen and Terry, the ratio of government
interest to intrusion was quite high. The Court was careful to
note that the intrusion in both Terry and Jacobsen was low.210
By contrast the governmental interests—preventing and detecting crime and ensuring the safety of the officer in Terry—were
quite high. Here however, the governmental interest, while
somewhat strong, pales in comparison to the degree and length
of intrusion of one’s possessory interests.
In sum, even without the added scrutiny invited by the
implication of First Amendment concerns, the attachment of a
GPS device constitutes the seizure of a car. Law enforcement
meaningfully interferes with possessory interests by converting
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the nature of the automobile from a provider of transportation
to a government informant. Additionally, law enforcement must
exert dominion and control over the vehicle, thus violating the
fundamental prerogative of the owner to exclude all others from
his or her own property. This interference is both intrusive and
constant. It provides a comprehensive dossier of a person’s interactions, travels, and associates, and it does so without pause.
The conversion is indefinite but likely extended in duration and
potentially permanent. Finally, the governmental interest in preventing and detecting crime does not balance out the intrusiveness and duration that renders the seizure unreasonable. The
fact that the seizure implicates First Amendment concerns only
strengthens this analysis.

VI. THE USE OF A GPS DEVICE SHOULD BE
PREAUTHORIZED BY A WARRANT
The text of the Fourth Amendment does not mandate that
law enforcement obtain a warrant before conducting a search or
seizure. The Fourth Amendment requires only that “[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .”211 Nevertheless, the Court has interpreted reasonableness to require a warrant before law enforcement can
conduct a search or seizure.212 In Johnson, the Court overturned
an opium user’s convictions after law enforcement searched her
room without a warrant. The Court did so despite conceding
that the presence of an odor that law enforcement officials recognized as burning opium probably furnished the agents with
probable cause. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the decision
of whether information known to officers is sufficient to justify
the intrusion of a defendant’s privacy is to be made by a judicial
officer, not the police officer on the ground. The Court clarified
that the Amendment’s protections do not “den[y] law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men
draw from evidence.”213 Instead, the Court required “that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”214
Therefore, a ruling that the use of GPS devices constitutes
a Fourth Amendment seizure triggers the warrant requirement.
While there are several “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement, none applies
to the most common use of GPS devices.215 Some of the following are exceptions that the Court has recognized: the presence
of exigent circumstances such as the hot pursuit of a fleeing
felon,216 investigating reasonably suspicious behavior and ensuring officer safety,217 consent searches,218 searches conducted
incident to a valid arrest,219 searches of automobiles,220 and
searches of items in plain view.221 Each exception is informed
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by a particular purpose. With respect to investigatory stops and
frisks, the Court noted that officer safety was a critical basis for
the exception but required that any search be limited to only that
exploration necessary to discover weapons.222 Similarly, when
discussing the exigent circumstances exception, the Court reasoned that such an exception exists to protect against the danger
that evidence is destroyed or harm caused to the pursuing officers.223 In the case of GPS devices, there is little reason to create
an exception to the warrant requirement. Law enforcement must
already obtain and attach a GPS device. There is no reason they
could not obtain a warrant as well. In short, law enforcement
should be required to obtain a warrant before tracking suspects
by attaching GPS devices to their vehicles.

VII. CONCLUSION
Jeremy Bentham described his panopticon as “a new mode
of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto
without example.”224 The use of GPS devices leverages technology to achieve the same result as a panopticon. The Weaver
case aside, all indications are that law enforcement has been
judicious in their deployment of GPS technology. Nevertheless,
it defies logic to wait on the day that the Government “institute
programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements”225 as
Judge Posner suggests. The irony of Judge Posner’s statement
is that like the prisoners in a panopticon, neither the American
people nor the judicial system will be aware that law enforcement is watching. In other words, there is little evidence to suggest that the public would be aware of mass surveillance even if
it were taking place. While it may be counter-intuitive to think
of the attachment of a GPS device as a seizure rather than a
search, the dissonance is a result of the evolution of the Fourth
Amendment search and seizure doctrines. Under the prevailing
interpretation of the seizure prong of the Fourth Amendment,
the use of GPS devices constitutes a seizure, and law enforcement should be required to obtain a warrant before using them.
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